Edward Jay Epstein "Deception"

[Моргенштерн]

Source Notes


PART ONE

CHAPTERS 1-7


There are no secret sources for this book. I do not believe it is either necessary or fair to conceal from the reader where the information for an assertion comes from. The identity of the source is part of the context. Without it, the reader has only part of the story.

The way in which sources are treated distinguishes different forms of knowledge. Historical research requires every source be made explicit so that assertions can be assessed by outside observers. Science makes similar demands. A scientist conducting an experiment must disclose all the relevant data about its circumstances so another scientist in another laboratory can replicate and thereby test the experiment. Judicial knowledge is even more strict in this respect. A lawyer must expose the names of all his sources, and allow them to be cross-examined; otherwise their testimony will not be accepted. It is even a requirement of espionage assessment. Intelligence officers must subject their spies to counterintelligence scrutiny, or their reports are not accepted.

Only two forms of knowledge cross this principle: gossip and journalism. The gossip purposely obscures his sources, saying in effect, "Don't ask who I heard it from," to make the story more titillating. The journalist obscures his sources out of self-interest, claiming that unless he hides their identities, they will not provide him with further information. This claim assumes the sources are acting out of altruistic motives. If, however, they are providing the information out of self-interest—and much information comes from publicists and other paid agents—then their motive is part of the story.

I've never understood the journalistic argument for concealing sources except that it is self-serving. While a source might talk more freely if he need take no responsibility for what he says, he also has far less incentive to be completely truthful. The only check on the source's license to commit hyperbole, if not slander, under these rules is the journalist himself. But the very premise of concealing sources is that the journalist needs the cooperation of the source in the future. This makes the journalist himself an interested party.

Much of the writing about the CIA, FBI, and other intelligence services which has depended on cooperation from these agencies has been particularly blurred by source concealment. The common practice of authors, magazines, and publishers of making it appear that defectors have approached them by serendipity, when in fact they have come at the behest of the CIA or FBI, with which they have binding contracts restricting what they can say to a prepared brief, has made it more difficult to understand the job that intelligence services actually do. But rather than cultivating sources for future writing through the gift of anonymity, there is also the need to clarify the material provided by past sources especially as the author's client is his readers, not his sources.

The Angleton quotes come from interviews and conversations I had with him from 1977 to 1987. Whatever inhibitions I had about publishing this material while he was alive were lifted when he died in April 1987.

I have also spoken to many of the men who worked under him on his counterintelligence staff. Ray Rocca provided me with the staffs perspective on the Trust and other prewar Soviet deceptions. Scotty Miler, whom I saw in New Mexico six times over a five-year period, provided me with case histories of Golitsyn and Nosenko. I also spoke to Donovan Pratt, William Johnson, and William Hood about Angleton himself. Only one former staff member I spoke to provided a negative picture of Angleton, Claire Edward Petty. He had made the case in 1975 that Angleton himself would have been a prime candidate for recruitment by the KGB.

Aside from those on Angleton's staff, I learned a considerable amount on the cases, especially Nosenko and Golitsyn, from the foreign and American liaisons with whom Angleton dealt. The former category, which includes Stephen de Mowbray (MI6), Philippe de Vosjoli (SDECE), and Amos Manor (Mossad), were particularly helpful. The FBI liaison, Sam Papich, although he had been badly mistreated by Hoover, remained circumspect. Thomas Fox of the Defense Intelligence Agency, who had recently retired, was more open with me.

William Sullivan, who had his own ax to grind, believing that Hoover had made him into a scapegoat, told me about Fedora and Top Hat, which opened many other doors.

My chief source on Nosenko was Pete Bagley. We met together in Belgium, France, England, and the United States. At one point, we considered writing a book together on moles which never materialized. Jack Maury, a former chief of the Soviet Bloc Division, described the anti-Bagley "sick think" view. The Soviet Bloc division was called the Soviet Russia Division prior to 1965. As it involved the same personnel and tasks, I have referred to it throughout the text as the Soviet Division. I also discussed the Nosenko conflict within the CIA with Richard Helms, who described his role in the case, as did Admiral Rufus Taylor, whom Helms ordered to clear it up.

Other CIA executives with whom I spoke about the Nosenko case were Vincent Marchetti, a former Deputy Director, Gordon Stewart, the Inspector General who investigated it, David Slaw-son, who investigated Nosenko for the Warren Commission, and Stanley Pottinger, the Justice Department attorney who investigated the legality of Nosenko's confinement.

There were also supporters of Nosenko's, including Donald K. Jameson, whom I interviewed five times; John Barron, the Washington editor of the Reader's Digest, who had become a friend of Nosenko's and even attended his wedding; William Gunn, who did public relations work for the FBI; Richard Heuer, CIA analyst, who developed the view that the KGB had rules that would preclude it from sending a Nosenko-type defector; and John Hart, who unfortunately spoke to me only briefly over the telephone.

I did further research into Nosenko as a consultant on a BBC television docudrama in 1985—86 called "Nosenko, KGB Agent." When Richard Helms expressed surprise that one of the CIA's most esoteric cases could be turned into popular fare, William Hood joked, "The only thing left is a Nosenko ballet."

The most valuable public source on Nosenko is the published Appendix to the Hearings of the Select Committee on Assassination, U.S. House of Representatives, 95th Congress, 2nd Session, March 1979. The quotes about confining Nosenko come from the February 17, 1964, memorandum, "Nosenko: Current Status and Immediate Plans," Vol. IV, p. 87. Nosenko's contract with the CIA is revealed in pp. 67-70. Helms's testimony is in the same volume, see pp. 1-250. The testimony of Bagley (under the title "Deputy Chief) is in Vol. XII, pp. 573-644. Volume XII also has testimony from Nosenko, John Hart, and Bruce Solie, which provides important perspectives on the case.
The transcripts of my interviews with Nosenko are available at Boston University Library, as are Angleton's questions and Golitsyn's answers to my queries.

I discussed the issue of the CIA using defectors as surreptitious authors in "The Spy Who Came in to Be Sold," New Republic, July 15, 1985, p. 35. The defector who told me a book had been prepared for him by the CIA which he rejected was John Sejna.

The Trust has been the subject of a number of books and studies. See Geoffrey Bailey, The Conspirators (New York: Harper & Row, 1960); V. I. Brunovsky, The Methods of the OGPU (London: Harper, 1931); and Anatoly Golitsyn, New Lies for Old (New York: Dodd Mead, 1983).

The version published under Kim Philby's name after he defected to Moscow, which has to be assumed to be a product of the KGB, is My Silent War (New York: Ballantine Books, 1983). This version has outcroppings in other books that relied on either Philby's book or Philby himself as a source. See, for example, Bruce Page, David Leitch, and Philip Knightley, The Philby Conspiracy (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1968).

The Polish side of the WINS deception was described to me by Michael Goleniewski, the former Deputy Director of Polish Military Intelligence, who defected to the United States in 1961. My interviews with him are in the Boston University Archives.

The conflict within the CIA, which did not emerge publicly until the mid-1970s, can be found in my "The War Within the CIA," Commentary (August 1978); William Colby's Honorable Men: My Life in the CIA (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1978); Seymour Hersh's "Angleton," The New York Times Magazine, June 25, 1978; and David Martin's Wilderness of Mirrors (New York: Harper & Row, 1982).

For the "Chinese strategist Sun-tzu," see Sun-tzu, The Art of War (London: Hodder & Stoughton, 1981), p. 17. The book, which is the bible of deception, was written by Sun-tzu, a general for the King of Wu in China in about 500 B.C., along with commentaries handed from one generation to another of Chinese leaders. The Giles translation was made in 1905. For "When able to attack," see ibid., pp. 15-18. For "categories of spies," see pp. 95ff. The intelligence system of Sun-tzu also included two other categories of spies: the "return" spy, who served as courier and paymaster for inward spies; and the "local spy," who was a clan-destine observer sent behind enemy lines to glean specific facts. In The Chinese Machiavelli: 3,000 Years of Chinese Statecraft (New York: Farrar, Straus, 1976), Dennis and Ching Ping Bloodworth demonstrate that Sun-tzu provided much of the continuity in Chinese military doctrine.


PART TWO

8. THE DECEPTION CONFERENCES


1. The first conference I went to was called officially "Intelligence: Deception and Surprise." It was held April 24-26, 1979, in Cambridge, Massachusetts, under the auspices of the International Security Studies Program of Tufts University. At that conference I met Roy C. Godson, an energetic professor from Georgetown, who invited me to participate in his Consortium for the Study of Intelligence. The first meeting took place on November 1, 1979, at the International Club in Washington, D.C. I presented a brief paper there on deception that was later published in a book edited by Godson, Intelligence Requirements for the 1980s: Analysis and Estimates (New Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction Books, 1980). I continued to attend these meetings over the course of the next two years.
2. R. V. Jones had written of his work as a deception planner in Most Secret War (London: Coronet Books, 1979), as well as in "The Theory of Practical Joking," Bulletin of the Institute of Physics (June 1957), pp. 193-201. Barton Whaley wrote, among other things, Stratagem: Deception and Surprise in War (Cambridge, Mass.: Center for International Studies, MIT, 1969). In a 600-page appendix, he lists both the tactical and strategic deceptions and shows that in the vast preponderance of cases, they worked. Only 150 copies of this work were made available. Michael I. Handel had written "Perception, Deception and Surprise," Jerusalem Papers on Peace Problems, no. 19, The Hebrew University (Jerusalem: Jerusalem Post Press, 1976).
3. For narcotics stings, see my book Agency of Fear (New York: Putnam, 1976). For the Navy scandal, see The New York Times, October 30, 1984, p. A21. The 1RS undercover operations are described in "Stinging Success," Barron's, October 8, 1984, p. 16. The undercover operations of no less than three hundred Fish and Wildlife Service employees in Operation Falcon were reported in The New York Times, August 30, 1984, p. A15. A similar deception was used in 1984 to trap car owners in New York City who falsely reported their cars stolen after they had sold them, to collect the insurance money. Here the FBI set up a fake business called G&N Storage and Towing, which offered to discreetly buy cars for scrap. After the owners reported them stolen, they were confronted with the actual car and charged with fraud. The New York Times, "Car Insurance Fraud 'Sting' Nets 122 in City," December 18, 1984, p. 1.
4. For the czarist agent provocateur system, see A. T. Vasilyev, The Okhrana: The Russian Secret Police (Westport, Conn.: Hyperion Press, 1930). The Grand Duke was assassinated on the orders of the Okhrana-controlled agent Yevno Azev. In 1893, Azev began his career as an agent provocateur, and by 1901 had become the head of the "Combat Section," which undertook assassination and sabotage, for the Social Revolutionaries—perhaps the most radical of all the anti-czarist groups. Through his activities, the Okhrana not only had foreknowledge of the group's terrorism but it was able to use it to discredit the entire dissident movement. For a description of Azev's career, see Boris I. Nikolaevskii, Azeff: The Russian Judas (London: Hurst & Blackett, 1934).
5. For the FBI's undercover operations, see Select Committee to Study Government Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities, Final Report, U.S. Senate, 94th Congress, 1st Session, 1976, Book 2. Aside from the FBI, the hearings it is based on provide a detailed picture of the use of deception by the military and CIA to control domestic dissidence. James Q. Wilson, Henry Lee Shat-tuck Professor of Government at Harvard, received unique access to study the central files of both the FBI and the Drag Enforcement Agencies in the late 1970s, and his book The Investigators (New York: Basic Books, 1978) illuminates the logic and strategy of employing agents provocateurs. William Sullivan, who was Assistant Director of the FBI, explained to me Hoover's rationale for maintaining the Communist Party in interviews I had with him in 1977.
6. For the British deception plan, see Anthony Cave Brown, Body-guard of Lies (New York: Harper & Row, 1976). Also, the remedial review of it by Michael Howard, Times Literary Supplement, May 28, 1976.
7. See Frederick Winterbotham, The Ultra Secret (London: Weiden-feld & Nicolson, 1974), and Ronald Lewin, Ultra Goes to War (London: Hutchinson, 1978).
8. On the German deception of Stalin, see Barton Whaley, Codeword Barbarossa (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1968).
9. On Stalin's deception of the Germans, see Frederick S. Feer, "Incorporating Analysis of Foreign Governments' Deception into U.S. Systems," in Godson, ed., Intelligence Requirements for the 1980s: Analysis and Estimates. Feer, who attended some of the conferences, was a former CIA officer.
10. For the Japanese deception, see Masatake Okumiya and Jiro Hor-ikoshi, Zero: The Story of the Japanese Naval Air Force, 1937-1945 (London: Cassell, 1957), p. 37. Also, Gordon W. Prange, At Dawn We Slept (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1983). Roberta Wohlstetter provides the classic study about the transmission of intelligence during the attack itself in her Pearl Harbor: Warning and Decision (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1962).
11. On the British "double cross system," see John Masterman, The Double-Cross System (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1972). The subject was updated and expanded in 1981 by Nigel West in MI5 (London: Bodley Head, 1981).
12. For the German double cross, see the account of H. J. Giskes, who organized it, in London Calling North Pole (New York: Bantam Books, 1982), pp. 2-89. See also Lauren Paine, The Abwehr (London: Hale, 1984), p. 134ff. For other German double-cross systems in Europe, see West, op. cit., pp. 143—153, and Paine, op. cit., pp. 145-147.
13. For the Soviet double cross, see Chapman Pincher, Their Trade Is Treachery (New York: Bantam Books, 1982), p. 125. On the Soviet use of military disinformation, see Frederick S. Feer, The Impact of Soviet Misinformation on Military Operations: 1920-1979 (Marina del Rey, Calif.: Analytical Assessment Corp., 1979), pp. 12-13.


9. THE GOLDHAMER INVENTORY


1. Herbert Goldhamer's unfinished work is contained in Herbert Goldhamer, Reality and Belief in Military Affairs: A First Draft (Santa Monica, Calif. : RAND, 1977), and Joan Goldhamer, Reality and Belief in Military Affairs: An Inventory of Additional Material in the file of Herbert Goldhamer (Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND, 1981).
2. For "little offensive capability," see William Manchester, The Arms of Krupp (New York: Bantam Books, 1970).
3. See Michael Mihalka, German Strategic Deception in the 1930s (Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND, 1980).
4. For "legacy of fear," see George H. Quester, Deterrence Before Hiroshima (New York: Wiley, 1966), p. 90. In France, see Ladoslas Mysyrowicz, Autopsie d'une defaite (Lausanne: Editions l'Age d'Homme,1973), pp. 184-185.
5. See William R. Harris, "Counterintelligence Jurisdiction and the Double Cross System by National Technical Means," mimeo (Washington, D.C., Consortium on Intelligence, April 24, 1980), p. 2.
6. See Geoffrey Bailey, The Conspirators (New York: Harper & Row, 1960), pp. 194-198.
7. For "Winterbotham himself had feigned sympathy for Hitler," and the curious relationship between Winterbotham, De Ropp, and German intelligence, see Ladislav Farrago, The Game of the Foxes (New York: David McKay, 1971), pp. 91ff.
8. The quote "Naturally we were aware . . . of all the major powers" is from Heinz Riechoff, cited in Mihalka, op. cit., p. 61.
9. For General Joseph Vuillemen's exposure to a "vastly inflated figure of German air strength," see Paul Stehlin, Temoignage pour l'histoire (Paris: Editions Robert Laffont, 1964), pp. 82-92.
10. "Convinced that war would mean the ruin of Paris": see Donald Cameron Watt, Too Serious a Business (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1975), pp. 86-93. Also Herbert Malloy Mason, Jr., The Rise of the Luftwaffe (New York: Dial Press, 1973), pp. 244-245.
11. On Goering's use of Lindbergh, see Leonard Mosley, Reichs Marshall: A Biography of Hermann Goering (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday,1974). See also the review of Mosley's book by J. D. Miller, Times Literary Supplement, November 12, 1976, p. 1432.
12. On the "flying pencil" deception, see Mason, op. cit., p. 240.
13. On the "Amerika-Bomber" deception, see ibid., p. 372n.
14. The quote "In addition to the systematic bluff organized at [the] top level . . . also willing self-deception" is from Heinz Riechoff, cited in Mihalka, op. cit., p. 61.
15. Mason, op. cit., pp. 344-346. Mason points out that after the German bombing of Rotterdam it was reported 30,000 people had been killed. In fact, according to a body count, there were only 814 fatalities.
16. For British press coverage, see John Wood's Ph.D. dissertation, "The 'Luftwaffe' as a Factor in British Policy, 1935-1939," (Tulane University, New Orleans, 1965). See also Mihalka, op. cit., p. 71.
17. The quote by Hitler on "bombs or ammunition" is cited by David Irving, The War Path (London: Papermac, 1983), p. 74.
18. A. J. P. Taylor, The Origins of the Second World War (London: Penguin Books, 1964), p. 18.
19. For Hitler's quote about "our tail between our legs," see Irving, op. cit., p. 46.
20. Mason, op. cit., p. 21 Off.
21. On French liaison officers and British attachés in Paris, see George H. Questor, Nuclear Diplomacy (New York: Dunellen, 1970), pp. 97-98.
22. On the Munich negotiations, see Telford Taylor, Munich: The Price of Peace (London: Hodder & Stoughton, 1979).
23. On Hitler's gain at Berlin, see Mason, op. cit., p. 244.
24. "Hitler himself made no secret": His speech is quoted by Z. A. B. Zeman, Nazi Propaganda (New York: Oxford University Press, 1973).
25. "What only the Luftwaffe High Command knew": Mason, op. cit., p. 244.
26. The account of the purge, and the quote "a blow could be struck at the leadership of the Red Army," comes from Walter Schellenberg, The Labyrinth (New York: Harper & Row, 1956), p. 25.
27. On Stalin's purge, see Bailey, op. cit., pp. 133ff.
28. For "staging a fake attack on a German outpost," see Schellenberg, op. cit., pp. 48-54.
29. On the Ellis affair, see Chapman Pincher, Too Secret Too Long (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1984), pp. 440-456.
30. For the Venlo Incident, see Nigel West, M16 (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1983), pp. 70-75. Also, for a first-hand account, Sigismund Payne Best, The Venlo Incident (London: 1950). The latter was based on his 1945 debriefing.
31. For "the British still clung to the hope," see West, MI6, pp. 75-76.
32. "Hitler launched surprise attacks": Klaus Knorr and Patrick Morgan, Strategic Military Surprise (New Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction Books, 1983), pp. 17-23.


10. THE NEW MAGINOT LINE


1. Bobby Ray Inman view of Soviet deception and "Potemkin villages," Bob Woodward, Veil: The Secret Wars of the CIA (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1987), pp. 474-475. For the NSA and the CIA assumed Soviet data "came in relatively pure," ibid., p. 202.
2. Stansfield Turner, Secrecy and Democracy (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1985), p. 92.
3. The panel discussion on the allocation of funds at the Air Force Academy at Boulder, Colorado, on June 6, 1984, Panel B-4.
4. The Krasnoyarsk delay, p. 65. For the failure to photograph Soviet fourth-generation missiles, see Angelo Codevilla, "Ignorance vs. Intelligence," Commentary (May 1987), p. 77.
5. William Kampiles: See Henry Hurt, "CIA in Crisis: The Kampiles Case," Reader's Digest (June 1979), pp. 65-72.
6. See William R. Harris, "Soviet Maskirovka and Arms Control Verification," mimeo (September 16, 1986), pp. 21-25.
7. The Satellite Warning System used "to prepare and carry out. . . special measures for disinformation of the enemy": Aleksei Myagkov, Inside the KGB (New Rochelle, N.Y.: Arlington House, 1976), p. 121. For fake military equipment, see William J. Broad, "US Designs Spy Satellites to Be More Secret Than Ever," The New York Times, November 3, 1987, p. 1.
8. For the special staff, GUSM: Victor Suvorov, "GUSM: The Soviet Service of Strategic Deception," International Defense Review, vol. 18, no. 8 (August 1985), pp. 1235ff.
9. World War II photographic capacity: My interviews with Amrom Katz, 1979.
10. On signals intelligence satellites, see Jeffrey Richelson, American Espionage and the Soviet Target (New York: Morrow, 1987), pp. 222ff.
11. For the Christopher Boyce betrayal, see Robert Lindsey, The Falcon and the Snowman (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1979).
12. Angelo M. Codevilla, "Space, Intelligence and Deception," mimeo (September 26, 1985), p. 8.
13. The quote is from Malcolm Wallop and Angelo Codevilla, The Arms Control Delusion (San Francisco: ICS Press, 1987), p. 65.


11. THE TELEMETRY DOUBLE CROSS


1. For Amrom Katz's role, see Merton E. Davis and William R. Harris, "RAND's Role in the Evolution of Balloon and Satellite Observation Systems and Related U.S. Space Technology," paper (Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND, 1988).
2. For a fuller discussion of the logic of "National Technical Means," see Amrom H. Katz, Verification and SALT (Washington, D.C.: Heritage Foundation, 1979).
3. See William R. Harris, Intelligence and National Security: A Bibliography with Selected Annotations (Cambridge, Mass.: Center for International Affairs, 1968). His interests can be gleaned from such other of his writings as "Counter-deception Planning," paper (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University, 1972); "Soviet Maskirovka and Arms Control Verification," mimeo (Monterey, Calif.: U.S. Navy Postgraduate School, September 1985); "Breaches of Arms Control Obligations," mimeo (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University, September 22, 1983); "A SALT Safeguard Program: Coping with Soviet Deception Under Strategic Arms Agreements," paper (Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND, 1979); and "Counterintelligence Jurisdiction and the Double Cross System by National Technical Means," in Roy C. Godson, ed., Intelligence Requirements for the 1980s: Counterintelligence (New Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction Press, 1980), pp. 53-91.
4. Harris provided me with a non-classified computer printout of Soviet scientific articles detailing the method the CIA assumed the Soviets were using. They described a system in which the three accelerometers on each axis would "vote," with the least accurate dropping out and the measurement of the other two averaged together.
5. For greater detail on NSA defectors Mitchell and Martin, see James Bamford, The Puzzle Palace (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1983).
6. See West, MI6, pp. 28ff.
7. For a public account of crater deception, see "Soviet False Craters," The Washington Times, August 7, 1985, p. 1.
8. My book was Agency of Fear (New York: Putnam, 1977). Fox served in the Office of National Narcotics Intelligence in 1973.
9. Whalen was paroled in 1972. See my "Spy War," The New York Times Magazine, September 28, 1980, p. 102.
10. Fox also helped me to obtain under the Freedom of Information Act the investigative report by General Joseph P. Carroll that revealed the pilfering ring.


12. THE WAR OF THE MOLES


1. The Soviet bloc case officer was Pete Bagley. He told me about his novel in 1977. Angleton commented on it five years later.
2. False flag compromises: Frederick Forsyth's novel The Odessa File (New York: Bantam, 1974) is based on an actual case in which East German intelligence officers assumed the identities of diehard Hitlerites, and even created a secret Nazi organization, to recruit West German intelligence officers who secretly harbored pro-Nazi sympathies.
3. I found the study "Motivations to Treason" in the Teheran Archive, Vol. 51, p. 30.
4. Bagley did the CIA's damage assessment report on Felfe. I later discussed the case with Angleton; the analysis of it in the text is Angleton's.
6. The conclusion that there had been over one hundred defectors comes from the study done by Richards J. Heuer, a former CIA case officer, and the discussion of it afterwards at the Conference at the U.S. Navy Postgraduate School in September 1984.
7. The best chronology on the Penkovsky case is by Joseph D. Doug-lass, Jr., "Colonel Oleg Penkovsky, Intelligence Coup—But Whose?", mimeo, privately circulated (November 1981).
8. For Moellering quote and "blow back," see Woodward, op. cit., p. 473.
9. For Richard Craig Smith, see The New York Times, April 5, 1984, and April 10, 1984.


13. THE DENIAL OF DECEPTION


1. Richards J. Heuer, Jr.: "understand the KGB better than any agency of the U.S. government" and "If there is one thing more important to the Soviets ... it is protecting their own security". These quotes are from discussions at the conference which I attended and Heuer's paper, "Soviet Organization and Doctrine for Strategic Deception," mimeo (1985), pp. 26-30.
2. The source for the CIA's conclusion that it had never been deceived by a Soviet double agent on any issue of strategic importance is David Sullivan, who drafted Senator Helms's questions and supplied me with their answers. Sullivan, a former CIA analyst and critic who was fired for making CIA data available to Senator Henry Jackson, attended this conference.
3. For Admiral Turner's assessment about the "paranoia of the CIA's counterintelligence staff," see his revealing autobiography Secrecy and Democracy (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1985), p. 72.
4. Vitaliy Yurchenko biography: CIA document (available in my archives, Boston University). The investigation I did of the Yurchenko case in 1985-86 was for Life and The Observer (London).
5. The original report on A. G. Tolkachev was by William Kucewicz, "KGB Defector Confirms U.S. Intelligence Fiasco," Wall Street Journal, October 17, 1985.
6. Defections of Igor Gheja, Sergei Bokhan: Christian Science Monitor, October 28, 1985, and The New York Times, October 1, 1985, and November 1, 1985. Oleg Antonovich Gordievsky: Time, September 23, 1985, p. 20, and The Washington Post, September 14, 1985. A number of false stories were put out by British intelligence MI5, including one in which he was whisked out of Moscow.
7. Secret 1973 CIA memorandum, entitled "Turning Around RED-TOP Walk-ins": Teheran Archive, Vol. 53, pp. 28-29.
8. Wallop and McMahon: My interviews with Senator Wallop on December 5, 1985.
9. "The information [Yurchenko] provided was not anything new or sensational" is by President Reagan: "President Sees a Soviet 'Ploy,' " The New York Times, November 7, 1985, p. 1.
10. Yurchenko's re-defection: "Washington Ponders Nosenko," The New York Times, November 9, 1985. For prohibition on contact, see my interview with Scotty Miler, 1985. Also, "How Yurchenko Bade Adieu to CIA," The New York Times, November 7, 1985.
11. The New York Times, November 6, 1985, p. A12.
12. "This whole thing was very good theater": "US Aides Split," The New York Times, November 8, 1985, p. A10.
13. For Soviet map falsification, see "Soviet Officials Admit Maps Were Faked," The New York Times, September 3, 1988, p. 1.


14. THE CONFIDENCE GAME


1. "Tendency of Naval officers and others who have taken part in negotiations, to become advocates of the integrity of the persons of whom they secured the agreement." Amrom Katz, Verification and SALT (Washington, D.C.: Heritage Foundation, 1979), pp. 12-14.
2. "We have . . . probably 30 to 40 requests per year from Iranians and Iranian exiles": President's Special Review Board, The Tower Commission Report (New York: Times Books/Bantam Books, 1987), p. 106.
3. Ghorbanifar and Theodore Shackley: ibid., p. 106.
4. "We know the CIA . . . they want to tear us like Kleenex—use us for their purpose and then throw us out the window.": ibid., p. 107.
5. "High individuals inside the Iranian government.": ibid., pp. 210-213.
6. Ghorbanifar's bona fides: ibid., pp. 205-207.
7. Ghorbanifar pressed for increased deliveries of U.S. Arms: ibid., pp. 224-244.
8. "Whether we trust Ghorbanifar or not, he is irrefutably the deepest penetration we have achieved into the current Iranian Government.": ibid, pp. 193-4.
9. CIA lie detector results: ibid., p. 206-212.
10. "Moderate elements in Iran can come to power if these factions demonstrate their credibility in aiding Iran against Iraq and in deterring Soviet intervention.": ibid., p. 215.
11. Charles Allen memo: ibid., pp. 212-213.
12. "We still have those contacts. . . and we're going to continue on this path.": ibid., pp. 502-505.



PART THREE

15. THE MILLENNIUM WAR


1. See Woodward, op cit., pp. 473ff.


16. THE WEAK LOOK


1. "The 'image of the enemy' ": Georgi Arbatov, "Facing a Choice," Kommunist, no. 5 (June 1988), p. 18.
2. Aganbegyan distortion: "CIA Cites Doubts on Soviet Economy," The New York Times, November 2, 1988, p. A9.
3. Walter S. Mossberg and John Walcott, The Wall Street Journal, August 11, 1988, p. 1.
4. The data on Soviet industrial production comes from "Gorbachev's Economic Plans," Study Papers, Joint Economic Committee, U.S. Congress, l00th Congress, 1st Session (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, November 23, 1987).
5. Soviet defense budget: Henry S. Rowen, "Gorbachev's Best Defense," The Wall Street Journal, September 29, 1988, p. 30.
6. Soviet military developments: Soviet Military Power: An Assessment of the Threat, 1988 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1988). For NATO, see Harry F. Yopung and Colleen Sussman, Atlas of NATO (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1985).
7. On decline in U.S. bases, see Thomas H. Moorer and Alvin J. Cottrell, "The World Environment and U.S. Policy," Strategic Review, no. 2 (Spring 1976), p. 64.
8. RAND study of Soviet economy: Benjamin Zycher and Tad Daley, "Military Dimensions of Communist Systems," paper (Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND, June 1988), pp. 3-7.


17. THE SIXTH GLASNOST


1. Glasnost defined: Mikhail Heller, The Formation of Soviet Man (New York: Knopf, 1988), p. xiii.
2. "Glasnost is a sword": ibid. Heller points out that Lenin used the expression "Glasnost" no less than forty-six times in his writing.
3. For 1921 Soviet industrial production, see Alec Nove, An Economic History of the Soviet Union (London: Penguin Books, 1982).
4. Golitsyn, op. cit., p. 42.
5. "They will sell it to us": Joseph Finder, Red Carpet (New York: New Republic/Holt Rinehart & Winston, 1983), p. 8.
6. The quotes from Lenin are from Vol. 45 of V. I. Lenin, Collected Works (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1970). "What we want to show and have in print... is that the Americans have gone in for concessions": ibid., p. 347.
7. Hammer: for a fuller account, see my "The Riddle of Armand Hammer," The New York Times Magazine, November 29, 1981, p. 69. The business records of Hammer's enterprise are from Department of Justice investigations: see my archives, Boston University. I discussed these matters with Hammer in 1981 in a series of interviews.
8. "Even if it is a fictitious one": Lenin, op. cit., p. 347.
9. "This is a small path to the American business world and this path should be made use of in every way": ibid., p. 559.
10. For the transfer of Western industry to the Soviet Union, see Anthony C. Sutton, Western Technology and Soviet Economic Development (Stanford, Calif.: Hoover Institution Press, 1968).
11. "Perestroika" as the "restructuring" of agriculture: The New York Times, Letter to Editor, February 28, 1988.
12. On the 1936 Constitution, see Heller and Nekrich, op. cit., p. 319.
13. Time, vol. 30, December 20, 1937, pp. 17-18. "Socialism is one country": Isaac Deutscher, Stalin (New York: Oxford University Press, 1966), pp. 43 lff.
14. "By technocrats and managers": Stephen de Mowbray, "Soviet Deception and the Onset of the Cold War," Encounter (July 1982), p. 8.
15. Alex de Jonge, Stalin (New York: Morrow, 1986), p. 434.
16. "The old idea of world revolution is dead": de Mowbray, op. cit., p. 8.
17. The "secret" speech: Joseph D. Douglass, Jr, "Soviet Strategic Deception," mimeo (April 2, 1984), pp. 2-6. The defectors are John Sejna and Anatoly Golitsyn; interviews with the author, 1982.
18. Harrison Salisbury, The New York Times, March 25, 1956, p. 1.
19. On private millionaires, underground businesses, and the thriving black market, see Golitsyn, op. cit., p. 120.
20. Ibid, p. 125.
21. "Inquire into opportunities for increased peaceful trade": Finder, op. cit., p. 142.
22. Ibid, p. 146.
23. "If we cannot give our people the same standard of living": Armand Hammer, Hammer (New York: Putnam, 1987), p. 323.
24. "If you give us credit. . . . You will keep your plants busy": Finder, op. cit., p. 146.
25. For the technocratic theme, see Albert Parry, The New Class Di-vided: Russian Science and Technology Versus Communism (New York: Macmillan, 1966).
26. Fedora's message was told to me by William Sullivan.
27. Soviet arms control and N. R. Mironov: see Joseph Douglass, Jr., Why the Soviets Violate Arms Control Treaties, Vol. I (Maclean, Va.: Falcon Associates, 1986), p. 67. General John Sejna was debriefed by Douglass and wrote an appendix to his book. Douglass also arranged for me to interview Sejna.
28. The Soviet General Staffs Directorate for Strategic Deception: William R. Harris, "Soviet Maskirovka and Arms Control Verification," mimeo (September 26, 1986), p. 24.
29. Soviet negotiations: see Roger F. Staar, "Deception at MBFR: A Case Study," presented at the U.S. Navy Postgraduate College, September 1985, Monterey, Calif.
30. "The proposition that elements . . . preconceptions of the 'doves' in the Kremlin fighting a valiant battle against 'hard-liners' ": Henry Kissinger, Years of Upheaval (Boston: Little, Brown, 1982), p. 269.
31. Quoted in Douglass, Why the Soviets Violate Arms Control Treaties, Vol. 1, p. 123.
32. Ion Pacepa interview by Michael A. Ledeen, Politique International, October 1988, p. 12. The draft was supplied to me by Michael Ledeen.
33. Wall Street Journal, December 12, 1988, p. A9.
34. "Military deliveries to North Vietnam": Kissinger, op. cit., p. 295.
35. "We . . . had used detente to isolate Hanoi and extricate ourselves from Vietnam": ibid., p. 1030.
36. Underestimating Soviet missiles: Albert Wohlstetter, Legends of the Strategic Arms Race (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Strategic Institute, 1975).
37. "So condemnatory of the performance . . . ought to be done," Lionel Olmer, "Watchdogging Intelligence," in Seminar on Command Control Communications and Intelligence (Cambridge, Mass.: Center for Information Policy Research, Harvard University, 1980), pp. 179-180.
38. Richard Pipes, "Team B: The Reality Behind the Myth," Commentary (October 1986), pp. 25ff.
39. "Soviet nuclear strategy had to be seen in context of grand strategy": ibid., p. 33.
40. For Andropov, see my "The Andropov File," New Republic, February 7, 1983, p. 18.
41. Underground journals: The New York Times, January 12, 1988, p. 1.
42. Izvestia: Wall Street Journal, August 8, 1988, p. 1.
43. 1986 Glasnost translation: Heller, op. cit., p. xiii.
44. United States Trade and Economic Council: see my "Hammerization of Reagan," Manhattan, Inc. (May 1988). Also, Peter Gumbel, "Soviet, U.S. Firms Agree," Wall Street Journal, June 2, 1988, p. 2.

[Моргенштерн]

APPENDIX A



James Jesus Angleton's proposed questions for KGB defector Yuri Nosenko.

1. What happened to Rumyantsev when he tried to defect to the U.S. in 1959? Why did you omit this in your debriefing in 1964?
2. Is there rivalry between the KGB's First and Second Chief Directorates?
3. To what extent did the Second Chief Directorate know the operations of the Thirteenth Department of the First Chief Directorate?
4. What would Department Thirteen have known regarding Oswald's defection? Would General Rodin have known?
5. What happens when the Second Chief Directorate recruits an agent who returned to the West? Is he jointly handled?
6. Is an agent recruited by the Second Chief Directorate who is of value prepared to be handled by a stranger? Would this be true of an ideological agent as well as a mercenary agent?
7. To what extent do the First and Second Directorates coordinate the activities of foreign services?
8. Why was a KGB officer named Shitov sent to Cuba as the first Soviet Ambassador, under the pseudonym Alexeiev?
9. What was his role, if any, in coordinating Soviet and Cuban intelligence operations?
10. Oswald was issued an entrance visa to Cuba from Havana after he returned to the United States. Would this require the prior approval of the Second Chief Directorate?
11. If so, would it be arranged in Moscow or Havana? If the latter, would a Second Chief Directorate officer be called on to participate in the decision?
12. Agee went to Cuba under aliases four times while writing his book. Would he have seen Soviet intelligence in Moscow? Would these meetings be coordinated with the KGB? Why was Colonel Semenov, who knew Agee in Uruguay, there during Agee's trips?
13. What was Korovin doing in London in 1961?



APPENDIX B

Secret CIA memorandum on defectors captured from the files of the U.S. Embassy in Teheran. [A transcript of this memorandum follows below.]


Transcript:

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET RYBAT
DATE: 9 January 1973
TO: Chiefs of Station and Base
FROM: Chief, SB Division
SUBJECT: RYBAT REDTOP Turning Around REDTOP Walk-ins
ACTION: Read and Retain for Reference


1. In recent months a number of REDTOP nationals have walked into LNBUZZ installations seeking political asylum. Most have eventually been processed as refugees or defectors and many of the latter have provided useful information. A substantial number have been persuaded to return to their homelands to work on our behalf and most of these are now of very great value as long-term in-place agents. In some cases, Stations have handled REDTOP walk-ins well; in others, extremely valuable opportunities have been lost. These losses have generally resulted from misunderstandings in field Stations about WOMACE goals, priorities and capabilities and from difficulty in communicating with the walk-in. This dispatch and its attachments are designed to clarify our aims, to acquaint field Stations with BKHERALD abilities to exploit REDTOP walk-ins, and to enable officers to obtain essential information from REDTOP nationals with whom they have no common language.

2. Putting aside the question of LNBUZZ responsibilities for asylum seekers and for assistance to refugees, which have been covered elsewhere in dispatches and airgrams, we are here concerned only with individuals of intelligence interest. While defectors can and do provide critical information, there are very few cases in which the same individual would not have been of greater value if he had returned to his post and remained in place, at least for a reasonable period. A "turn-around" therefore should remain the first goal in handling a well-placed walk-in. In addition, normally with Headquarters guidance, an attempt should sometimes be made to turn around an individual who appears to be promising agent material even if, at the moment, he does not enjoy good access. If a young and personable walk-in with strong motivation but without immediate apparent access should walk in, we are prepared to guide and assist him in his career, running him in place until he develops access we need. Most such walk-ins would qualify only as refugees, not defectors, which fact can be used as an argument in favor of turning around.

3. When we speak of turning the walk-in around to "work in place," we usually mean working in place after his return to his home country. Obviously, if a REDTOP official stationed in your area can be turned around, we would hope to exploit his position for intelligence purposes as long as he remains stationed outside REDTOP. Other than in exceptional cases, however, our ultimate objective is to have the walk-in return to his home country and continue his agent relationship while working inside.

4. BKHERALD can and does run many resident agents inside the REDTOP countries. We have the capability to mount and support such operations over an indefinite period and we are currently able to exfiltrate agents, in most cases with their families, from the REDTOP countries when it is time for them to leave. To enable us successfully to turn walk-ins into resident REDTOP agents, however, it is essential that all BKHERALD officers who are likely to interview such persons should have some familiarity with our procedures; and it is equally essential that all field Stations have on hand the operational tools to obtain information necessary to Headquarters to enable us to recommend courses of action. In virtually all walk-in cases, the time available is extremely limited; unless the case officer obtains at least the minimum information necessary, unless Headquarters is notified immediately, and unless Headquarters can respond quickly with guidance, we may find that time has robbed us of the opportunity to tum the walk-in around. Field Stations must, therefore, be prepared to handle walk-in cases in which there may be no immediate opportunity of meeting again with the potential agent, as well as those in which planning may be somewhat more leisurely.

5. General procedures used in "turn-arounds" are perhaps best illustrated by outlining how typical cases have been handled recently when time available is relatively limited:
a. In the initial meeting the individual is debriefed by the Station or Base as to his motives, for biographic data and for necessary 01. If time permits, additional questions relating to areas of particular Station or Base interest could be included in this or subsequent debriefings prior to his departure.
b. Headquarters is informed of the situation and provided with all pertinent details by [Immediate] NIACT or Flash cable precedence. In this respect a series of short cables will frequently be more efficient than one, more lengthy, cable.
c. Headquarters responds with guidance for both the Station or Base and the walk-in, including assignment of a particular SW receiving system. The walk-in is instructed in recovery of this SW system and an SW indicator is established. The walk-in is then told to return to his country and expect a letter (rnailed securely in his own country by a BKHERALD officer) containing an SW message with instructions approximately two to three months after his return.
d. Headquarters then assembles a package containing covert communications materials, reporting requirements and other instructions, which is deaddropped or otherwise secretly delivered to the agent in his homeland.
e. An SW message is subsequently mailed internally to the walk-in giving him directions on how to retrieve the ops package.

6. The precise operational planning will vary, of course, with the situation; e.g., are the identity and access of the walk-in established, or is he an unknown quantity? Is this a crash operation in which our time with the walk-in is severely limited, or is there sufficient time to evolve a more sophisticated and efficient operational plan? The answers to these questions will help determine such questions as whether to handle him initially via indirect, non-personal communications, or whether to move him immediately into a communications plan involving more risky commitment of our REDTOP area staffers. If time permits and the replies to our questions so indicate, some turn-arounds may even be issued materials for preparing SW messages before they return to their homeland.

7. The most important single requirement to keep in mind in the crash situation is that we must have the walk-in's mailing address in his homeland. By that we mean an address at which he can securely receive internally posted mail; i.e., mail posted within his country. This might be his home address or the address of a friend or relative who would not be made suspicious by the arrival of mail for him. The most efficient method of acquiring this information is to have him address a sample envelope to himself in his own language, assuring him that this is merely an exemplar which will not itself be used. We also need to establish with the walk-in an SW indicator, perhaps a name or a phrase within the body of the open text, which will tell him that the letter contains SW. In its initial response, Headquarters will normally indicate if SW is authorized, and which of the SW receiving systems is to be issued. If there is insufficient time for consultation with Headquarters, do not hesitate to issue the scorch or water developed system to any promising walk-in. Under such circumstances, should a walk-in not be willing to accept either of these two systems, or if for any other reason they are not suitable, the station may also issue the microdot receiving system without prior approval from Headquarters.

8. In the case of the walk-in where circumstances give Headquarters more time to provide guidance and expertise, the handling will be somewhat different. If we have enough time and the individual has sufficient promise, we will probably dispatch a staff officer experienced in the communications systems we use in the REDTOP area to train him directly for these highly disciplined communications. In this case, we might do away completely with the initial letter mailed inside the REDTOP area to the agent and put him directly on personal communications. Where we have enough time, but are dealing with an unknown quantity, we would probably be inclined to take that time to probe his motivations and his suitability as agent material. This could be done through cabled communications with Headquarters, or might be handled through a dispatch of a TDY officer from Headquarters.

9. To facilitate walk-in debriefing in both the crash and less hurried situations, attachment "A" contains copies of a questionnaire in English and the various REDTOP languages. A walk-in should be asked to complete this questionnaire in his own handwriting, printing the answers in capital letters. A transliteration table to [unreadable] letters is provided for the CKPOLAR, VSYOKE and YKBAND alphabets to allow accurate cabled reporting in his native language of an individual's responses. If desired, cables can be keyed to the attachment's numeration, by referring to this Dispatch. The questionnaire is divided into two Sections. Section I relates to the walk-in's current situation, status, and biographic history. Section II requests basic 01 information which would assist in clandestine communications planning. If time is available, the walk-in should be asked to fill out Section II only after Section I has been completed and Head-quarters has authorized the Station to proceed. In promising situations, however, where time is short, stations are authorized to proceed with Section II on their own initiatives. The value of these questionnaires is that all necessary information may be obtained by an officer not fluent in the walk-in's native language. Further, it assures that the most pertinent questions will be asked even if the available time is limited and that, by virtue of the walk-in providing written answers to the questions, ambiguities and inaccuracies are considerably reduced.

10. Attachment "B" contains forms in English and the REDTOP languages to assist in the establishment of communication with the walk-in. Included are questions concerning the individual's mailing address in his homeland and the type of mail he receives there, the establishment of an SW indicator, sets of instructions for the development or reading of several different agent SW receiving systems (including microdot) which do not require a specific developer, and SW carbon writing instructions. The agent-receiving instructions are accompanied by exemplars of developed messages and prepared messages which will enable the walk-in to practice developing if time and circumstances permit. Microdot receiving instructions include bullet lenses and exemplars of buried microdots. Practice SW carbons are provided with the SW carbon writing instructions. The foreign language versions are provided in two forms: on standard stationery, and in reduced printing on water soluble paper. The latter may be given the walk-in for subsequent study at his leisure; however, in no instance should he attempt to return to his country with these instructions.

11. The Attachment "B" instructions are more detailed than the standard WOLOCK forms intended for use primarily in conjunction with actual training by an SW technician. These expanded versions presuppose situations in which the attending case officer can provide little or no instructional assistance to the walk-in. However, it should be clearly understood that while these instructions are as comprehensive as possible their use cannot approach the effectiveness of training by a qualified SW instructor. In most cases where time and circumstances permit, we would prefer that a WOLOCK technician be called in to train the individual. By the some token, Chiefs of Station or Base should avail themselves of the opportunity, when a WOLOCK/CCB technician visits, to have case officers thoroughly trained in the use of the systems provided so that they can competently perform training if the need arises. As a minimum, all officers who might handle a walk-in should experiment with exemplars provided in Attachment "B". Additional copies for this purpose will be provided on request. all field operations officers should be completely familiar with these basic techniques.

12. Analysis of REDTOP walk-ins in recent years clearly indicates that REDTOP services have not been using sophisticated and serious walk-ins as a provocation technique. However, fear of provocation has been more responsible for bad handling of walk-ins than any other cause. We have concluded that we do ourselves a real disservice if we shy away from promising cases because of fear of provocation. We are willing to run any apparently useful case for a reasonable period and can do so in such a way that little or no harm will be done if the case should turn out to be controlled. We are confident that we are capable of determining whether or not a producing agent is supplying bona fide information.

13. A legal matter involving "turn-around" inducement requires special comment. Many walk-ins and defectors appear to be adamant in their insistence on guaranteed resettlement in WODUAL; Stations are not authorized to make such promises on their own; and Headquarters is traditionally reluctant to grant such authority. In fact this problem is more apparent than real. An agent who serves us loyally "inside" for a reasonable period of time (normally several years) will obviously be well taken care of when he wishes to "retire" and competent field operations officers will normally be able to make this clear without specific promise or resettlement in WODUAL. "The West" or "a friendly country" are acceptable. As a last resort, however, Headquarters will consider making a commitment to WODUAL resettlement when a walk-in's value appears to justify it. However, Stations should make every possible effort to turn around all walk-ins without such a commitment.

14. One final problem which has caused some difficulty is the fact that traffic relating to a walk-in is not always received by interested Headquarters elements on a timely basis. To expedite handling, as well as to insure security, cable traffic should be slugged "RYBAT PLAERONAUT" and sent by at least Immediate precedence. Use of a higher precedence may be dictated by time considerations. At least during the initial exchanges, the cable should not carry the EIRAS-
TIME indicator nor should there be any formal involvement with WONICK until approved by Headquarters. The PLAERONAUT slug will usually be used at least until all reasonable hope of turnaround is abandoned.

Robert P. TACEY



Acknowledgments


I owe a deep debt of gratitude to a number of the deception planners and deceptions buffs I met at the conferences described in the text, among them Berel Rodal, Joe Douglass, Jr, Amrom Katz, Roy Godson, Angelo Codevilla, Kenneth de Graffenreid, Herb Romerstein, P. L. Thyraud de Vosjoli, John Sejna, and William R. Harris. I benefited immeasurably from both their ideas and the doors that were opened for me.

I also participated in a half-dozen academic seminars on international deception at MIT, Harvard, and the Hoover Institution. There too I benefited from the ideas of Robert Conquest, Milton Friedman, Arnold Beichman, Edward Banfield, Peter Lupsha, Joe Finder, Steven Rosen, Ithiel de sola Poole, Adam Ulam, Graham Allison, Melvin Krauss, Thomas Sowell, Marty Anderson, Harvey Sapolsky, and Sidney Hook.

I owe appreciation to Rebecca Fraser for her aid in organizing the research, filing Freedom of Information requests, and debriefing Soviet bloc defectors. I am only sorry she returned to London before the book was completed. I would also like to thank Gabriel Schoenfeldt, Abbey Asher, Andrea Stuber, Edmund Levin, and Alexandra Rhodie for their research and assistance. I would particularly like to thank Sir James Goldsmith, Renata Adler, William Harris, and Lou Dobbs for taking time to read the draft manuscript. Their criticisms were of immense value to me. Belinda Loh of Simon and Schuster was enormously helpful in the final stages in keeping this book on track.
Finally, I am indebted to Robert Asahina for his intelligent and thoughtful editing of this manuscript. I deeply appreciate his indefatigable efforts to transform ten years of research into this book.