глава из книги Р. Шульца и Р. Годсона "Дезинформация"

[Моргенштерн]

(на английском языке, конечно).
Глава состоит из интервью, взятых у двух офицеров разведки советского блока, занимавшихся активными мероприятиями в 60-70-х годах - чехом Ладиславом Биттманом и советским Станиславом Левченко

CHAPTER V
INTERVIEWS WITH FORMER SOVIET BLOC INTELLIGENCE OFFICERS

This chapter contains interviews, conducted separately, with two former Soviet bloc intelligence officers who specialized in active measures during the 1960s and the 1970s.
Ladislav Bittman served as a career Czech intelligence officer from 1954 until 1968. During this period, he spent eight years abroad directing and recruiting spies, and for two years (1964-1966) held the post of Deputy Chief of the Disinforma¬tion Department (Department Eight) of the Czech intelligence service. From 1966 to 1968, Bittman operated in Vienna under diplomatic cover as a press attache of the Czechoslovakian Diplomatic Mission, attempting to manipulate the Austrian press and directing agents of influence. In August 1968, in the after¬math of the invasion of Czechoslovakia by Warsaw Pact forces, Bittman crossed the West German border and asked US authorities for asylum. He now lives in the United States.
Stanislav Levchenko worked for the International Department of the CPSU Central Committee from 1965 to 1971, assisting with the direction of Soviet international front organizations. He joined the KGB in 1971, and in the fall of 1972 became a case officer of the Japanese Desk of the 7th Department of the KGB's First Chief Directorate. In February 1975, Levchenko was assign¬ed to the Tokyo residency of the KGB to work in political in¬telligence; and in early 1979, he became the active chief of the Tokyo KGB residency's active measures group. In October 1979, Levchenko contacted US officials in Japan and requested asylum. Like Bittman, he now lives in the United States.
These two former specialists in active measures provide another level of information regarding how the Soviet bloc sought to influence international events during the 1960s and the 1970s. Both have published and lectured about their experiences, and are con¬sidered reliable. They are a unique source for the student of Soviet foreign policy behavior.
The authors conducted what in social science terms are called "semi-structured" interviews with Bittman and Levchenko separately during January and February 1983. In both cases, a systematic series of questions was asked concerning the manner in which active measures were formulated and conducted in the field. The questions addressed to Bittman and Levchenko con¬centrated on the organization, control, and evaluation of active measures, and on the specific procedures utilized for conducting influence operations. Additionally, Levchenko was asked to discuss his experiences with Soviet overt propaganda and inter¬national front organizations. The responses of Bittman and Lev¬chenko not only provide important insights into the ways in which Soviet bloc intelligence conducts active measures, but also pro¬vide — for the first time — information on how Moscow evaluates the effectiveness of these efforts.

INTERVIEW WITH LADISLAV BITTMAN, FORMER CZECH INTELLIGENCE OFFICER

For eight years during the late 1950s and the early 1960s, you recruited and directed agents of influence in Europe. What types of elites did you target, recruit, and direct? How many agents did you handle?

In the field, during the 1960s, agent-of-influence operations were the duty of the intelligence staff officer. At that time, although there was a disinformation department in Prague, it did not have its own officers in the field specifically for conduc¬ting influence operations. So, as an officer in the field, I targeted all major government offices and ministries, political par¬ties, opinion leaders, and so on, first of all for intelligence col¬lection. Within these target categories, we also conducted in¬fluence operations. I personally focused on political figures and journalists. At any given time, I had four or five agents, but not all would be conducting influence operations.

What was the political outlook of these agents? Where would you place them on the political spectrum ?

The objective, of course, is not to recruit solely on the left, but rather across the political spectrum. Let me use West Ger¬many as an example, for I had quite a lot of operational ex¬perience there. Czech intelligence recruited agents in all the political parties, including both the Social Democrats and the Christian Democrats. The Social Democratic Party was deeply penetrated, but we also had agents among the Christian Democrats. Furthermore, we focused our efforts not only on the federal structure, but also on the state parliaments.

What were your basic techniques for recruiting these agents?

Recruitment is a two-to-three year process that involves ex¬tensive background investigation to assess whether the target is vulnerable. During my years, blackmail was quite widely used. Ideology was of less importance during the 1960s in comparison with the 1950s. Money also was very important, and almost every case with which I was familiar included payments. Still, in many cases a blackmail angle was employed in hooking the target, but this was carried out in a careful and not a heavy-handed way. This aspect was handled more subtly in the 1960s than in the 1950s. However, case officers also would seek to establish com¬mon interests and concerns with the target, especially once the relationship had been established. In West Germany, for exam¬ple, if you were working with an individual on the political right, German nationalism, US domination and manipulation of West Germany, and similar acceptable themes were stressed.

Of the agents you directed, how many knew you were a Czech intelligence officer? Did they believe your cover?

In my own experience, almost every agent with whom I was connected knew I was a Czech intelligence officer — maybe not at first, but certainly once the relationship had developed. My own cover was within the Czech foreign ministry. However, a number of other institutions were likewise used. Every institu¬tion with foreign activities was employed, including trade organizations and associations, transportation organizations, journalist groups, and social groupings (e.g., victims of Nazi ag¬gression). During the early 1960s, increasing stress was placed in the professional development of the intelligence officer on becoming knowledgeable regarding the cover which would be employed. For example, the intelligence officer who would use the Czech press agency as a cover was expected to learn all aspects of it before going abroad. Other types of cover likewise required similar professional training.

Let us focus on journalists. You stated in your 1980 Congres¬sional testimony that during your time in the field, you were in contact with the director of a national television network in Western Europe. What other kinds of journalists did you recruit?

I did not personally make the recruitment approach, but in¬stead conducted the spotting and assessing of the target. Someone else would conduct the actual recruitment. Therefore, if the opera¬tion failed, I would not be exposed. We recruited many more journalists on the left of the political spectrum than in the center or on the right. A range of techniques was used to hook the in¬dividual. Subtle forms of blackmail were used in conjunction with money and the interaction of personalities (developing common interests and concerns). As with all recruitments, the objective was to establish a web of complicity that encircled the agent. Money was used to keep the person happy and producing.

How did you use these journalist recruits? Were they used only to publish articles? What were the themes you focused on?

The primary responsibility of these journalists was to publish articles and stories, but these pieces did not emphasize support for Soviet policy. Rather, the major focus concentrated on under¬mining the United States and NATO, and on creating rifts be¬tween West Germany and France or between the United States and its allies. The principal theme argued that the NATO alliance was disintegrating because the United States was militaristic, dangerous, and not sensitive to European needs. For example, in West Germany the United States was charged with ignoring German heritage and culture during the post-war occupation, and with forcing alien institutions and political culture on the Ger¬man people. West Germany, in turn, was presented to the French and to other Europeans as harboring strong Nazi tendencies, and it was claimed that many war criminals had been reinstated into positions of political power in the West German government. This was presented as extremely dangerous for all of Europe.

How did you get the journalists to produce? Did you provide completed articles for them to publish?

I knew of no situation in which completed articles were pass¬ed to an agent. This would be operationally awkward, and might end up revealing the association. The reason I say this is because it is extremely difficult to copy someone else's writing style. I did provide guidelines for the agent to follow. These consisted of a two- or three-page outline of objectives and themes to be covered in a given article. After I had provided these guidelines, the agent then would produce the story. Sometimes I would include materials and information he could draw upon.

Did the journalists you directed serve other purposes? Did you use them for influence operations against other journalists, political figures, or other important associates?

All agents, including journalists, were employed for intelligence collection. They frequently had access to confidential informa¬tion that could be quite useful. As for influence operations, during my time we used only a few journalists for this purpose. I would say that the majority of the journalists we directed were not used for influence operations. Only the most reliable individuals, and those with useful connections, were used in this capacity.

How about recruitment? Did you use journalists to recruit other journalists?

I would say that it was very rare indeed when an agent could be used in this capacity. He could be used, however, to identify potential targets. Furthermore, if he was acquainted with a target, the agent could assist in gathering the kinds of information necessary to determine whether the target was vulnerable, and how you might catch him.

How closely did headquarters monitor and evaluate journalist operations? What criteria were used to measure effectiveness?

In the case of journalists, the criteria tended to be straightfor¬ward: the number of articles published, the quality of these ar¬ticles, and where they appeared (i.e., whether they were published in a major newspaper). These were the general measures employed. Whether or not the articles persuaded the intended targets is much more difficult to determine, and is quite subjec¬tive. Evaluating other types of active measures operations was equally subjective. A forgery is a good example, as is overt propaganda. The immediate impact of these operations is often unclear. During my time, there was no highly developed system for measuring the immediate impact of disinformation exercises. All such operations were evaluated in terms of their cumulative ef¬fect on the target over time. This is the way Moscow and Prague approached such questions during the 1960s.

Let me ask you about the operations of the Disinformation Department (Department Eight) of the Czech intelligence service. When you were Deputy Chief of the Department in Prague (1964-1966), what was your relationship with officers in the field?

First of all, the Disinformation Department during the mid-1960s had no operatives in the field. Neither did it have authority over the territorial operational department officers who, in addition to their collection duties, did conduct active measures in the field. We could review and analyze their operations, make recommendations, and formulate suggestions, but we could not direct their activities. It should be remembered that active measures were initiated by the territorial departments, as an added function to their primary collection responsibilities. Department Eight had no operatives abroad with sole responsibility for con¬ducting active measures.
The sole authority held by Department Eight over the territorial departments was its regular annual evaluation of the active measures conducted throughout the intelligence apparatus, and its criticism of departments which had not been sufficiently ac¬tive. So, we could critically analyze and evaluate programs and make recommendations, but we had no operational control at the territorial level. Furthermore, since we did not have detailed knowledge of the agents recruited in the territorial departments, our recommendations took the form of more generalized guidelines. Thus, during the mid-1960s we could not effectively make use of the resources of the territorial departments in con¬ducting active measures.

Could Department Eight initiate any active measures of its own?

During my time, we generally focused on forgeries, black pro¬paganda, disinformation, rumors, and intrigues. (At that time, for the reasons discussed above, we were not involved with influence operations.) Basically, each of these special operations sought to deceive the enemy or victim by feeding him false in¬formation that would lead to the conclusions we wished him to reach. In the 1960s, the Czech intelligence service directed opera¬tions of this sort against such developing nations as Egypt and Algeria. The material utilized included forged data on various anti-Arab operations and on subversive activities planned by the United States, Great Britain, and other European nations. The objective was to deepen Arab distrust of the Western world, and draw the Arab states closer to Moscow and the Eastern bloc. Similar operations were directed against relations among the NATO allies. In 1964 I was involved in an extremely successful action (Operation Neptune) conducted against West Germany. It was announced that important Nazi documents, including lists of Nazi agents in Eastern Europe, had been discovered in a lake on the West German-Czech border. The goal was to paralyze the activities of West German intelligence. They were said to be work¬ing with former Nazi agents — people in Eastern Europe who had collaborated with the Nazi regime. It was hoped that these so-called lists would force West German intelligence to break con¬tact with these persons. The operation was considered most successful.

Let us return to influence operations. When you were stationed in West Germany, you directed agents in the German parliament. How did you use these agents? Did you employ them for influence operations?

As I stated above, the intelligence officer in the field conducted influence operations in addition to his primary collection respon¬sibilities. However, there were cases in West Germany in which recruited agents in parliament were employed for influence opera¬tions. For example, I was the case officer for Alfred Frenzel, a Social Democratic member of the Bundestag. Frenzel was a member of several parliamentary committees, including the Com¬mittee for Defense. He was used to obtain information about the defense capabilities of West Germany and NATO, and also was directed to influence certain decisions, if possible, in the in¬terest of the USSR. We instructed him on how to react and on what positions to take during meetings of parliament.

Broadly speaking, what were the major targets of the Czech Disinformation Department when you were Deputy Chief in the mid-1960s?

Based on plans prepared in the 1960s by Moscow and assign¬ed to the Czech service, the primary target was the United States. The objective was to damage the United States wherever possi¬ble, and to weaken its position in Western Europe. We sought to create rifts between the United States and its West European allies, as well as among the various members of NATO. For ex¬ample, we sought to cause disagreements between the United States and its NATO allies about the military strength of the War¬saw Pact countries. This military disinformation, in my estima¬tion, has developed into a very important aspect of current Soviet disinformation activities. Additionally, we also focused on the Third World, and on American relations with these new nations. Again, the objective of Czech disinformation was to cause rifts, and to discredit US policies and programs in the Third World.

How detailed were the directions Czech intelligence received from Moscow? How specific were these directions in an opera¬tional sense? How close was Moscow's oversight?

Let me answer this on two levels. First of all, during the 1960s, we received guidance and objectives from Moscow center, ar¬ticulated through KGB advisors who were present at all impor¬tant Czech intelligence service staff levels. These broad policy objectives directed Czech intelligence to develop programs aimed at damaging the United States whenever and wherever possi¬ble, to weaken the position of the United States and Western Europe, to create new rifts within the NATO alliance, and to cause breaches between the United States and the developing countries. Our staff then would meet and devise specific proposals and plans for implementing these guidelines in the field. Before these instructions were sent to the field, however, we consulted with the KGB officer assigned to our staff.

Were you required to clear all plans through this KGB officer? Could he reject your plans?

Yes, he was able to reject these directives. In my own case, the relationship was business-like. I would consult with him, and he might make changes and recommendations. However, it was always clear that he could say "no" to the plans. This staff over¬sight took place on a daily basis.

In the field, was there room for innovation? Could you make changes in orders and plans and then carry them out, or did everything require approval in Prague?

There was room, of course, for initiative and innovation among officers in the field. It was necessary, however, to clear changes and plans with headquarters. This was a time-consuming pro¬cess, which sometimes caused opportunities to be missed. In other words, a Czech field officer had to send all plans or changes back to Prague for review by the territorial operational department (and the department's Soviet advisor). This procedure applied to all active measures proposals.

For the officer in the field conducting influence and other ac¬tive measures operations, how closely were these operations evaluated? What criteria are used to evaluate operations?

Broadly speaking, each field officer was evaluated on an an¬nual basis. Headquarters would examine all your activities, how well you were doing with the agents you were directing, what these agents had achieved, and how far you could go with each. With regard to active measures, you were evaluated in terms of the number of operations proposed and conducted, and the success of these actions. Evaluative criteria did exist for these operations, although in certain cases these criteria were quite subjective. For example, as I noted earlier, influence operations conducted through journalists had specific measurements of effectiveness. These included the number of articles published, how effective¬ly they were written, and where they were published. In the case of a forgery, on the other hand, the criteria for effectiveness were much more subjective. This also was true of other techniques. It is important to note, however, that the Communist approach to questions of effectiveness is different from the Western ap¬proach. The Communist concern focuses more on the overall cumulative effect over time. Furthermore, the Communist view of time is much different from the Western view. Hence, Com¬munist leaders do not emphasize the specific effectiveness of each type of active measures operation, many of which are difficult to evaluate, to the extent this is emphasized in the West. In the Communist view, it is the cumulative impact that is important. This, at least, was my experience during the 1960s.

Many in the West discount Soviet and Eastern bloc use of agents of influence, international front organizations, and other active measures operations as either not very important or not very effective. Based on your experience in the 1960s, how would you respond to this assertion?

When the size and growth during the 1960s of the overall Soviet and Eastern bloc effort in this area are considered, it is clear that Moscow viewed this component of strategy as quite important. The resources and personnel devoted to these operations were rapidly expanding. Developments during the 1970s, in my opi¬nion, confirm the importance of these activities in Moscow's view. How effective have these efforts been in the overall scheme of things? Look at Soviet influence and presence in the world in 1980 as compared with 1955. Furthermore, my own study of Soviet military disinformation, economic games, use of refugee operations (recently Cubans), and influence operations leads me to the conclusion that these measures have played an important part in the overall Soviet effort directed against the United States and NATO.

INTERVIEW WITH STANISLAV LEVCHENKO, FORMER KGB INTELLIGENCE OFFICER

You handled journalists in Japan. How were you able to recruit them? What types of journalists did you seek for conducting active measures?

First of all, recruitment is a very long and complicated pro¬cess. It takes two to four years to complete a recruitment and have the agent producing for you. To accomplish this, you use all the tools of professional tradecraft. A thorough background investigation takes place to determine what angles to use in recruiting the target. A KGB officer generally focuses on recruiting two kinds of journalists. One type is the specialist in a particular subject area who possesses both sensitive informa¬tion and connections with key individuals.

What kinds of specialists does the KGB focus on?

Writers who have developed an expertise in various aspects of political, economic, or military affairs are sought. I concen¬trated on political specialists. Such an agent can be of assistance in a number of ways. He can produce stories, of course, sup¬porting Soviet objectives with respect to a particular issue. Ad¬ditionally, he may have access to confidential information which he can collect for you. Finally, because he is a specialist, he may know and interact with other elites. You then can task the agent to conduct various influence operations against these persons. Four of the agents I handled in Japan were prominent journalists. They had high-level contacts in the Socialist Party and the Liberal Democratic Party, and among government officials, including members of the Cabinet of Ministers. The journalists provided secret government information and documents. I also had them conduct various influence operations against these government officials.

What was the second category of journalist you focused on recruiting?

The second type of desired journalist is the individual with a wide following, or one associated with a newspaper with a wide distribution. One of the agents the KGB directed in Japan was a close confidant of the owner of a major Japanese newspaper with a daily circulation of three million copies. He was used to implement a variety of active measures against that newspaper.

Could you be a little more specific about the methods of recruit¬ment used, and the political views of the agents of influence you directed? How many agents did you handle?

Once the decision has been made to approach a journalist or a member of another elite group, various methods of tradecraft are used. The specifics are determined on a case-by-case basis. Let me outline a model case for you. Generally, the idea is to find some common ground or interest upon which you can agree, and then establish a personal relationship with the target. This approach can be applied to targets across the political spectrum. For those on the left, the common interest might be cast in ideological terms. For those on the right, however, the common interest may be a particular issue. For example, a target might be very pro-Taiwan and in opposition to closer relations between Japan and the People's Republic of China. The common ground here is obvious, and a deal could be made on this issue. If this individual were a journalist, I would assist him by providing money, moral support and encouragement, and possibly information and materials.

What other methods are used in recruitment? Is blackmail used to recruit an agent and keep him active?

While establishing a personal relationship and a common in¬terest is of the utmost importance, money also is useful. Certain individuals, even those who are anti-Soviet, will work for you solely for money. Money is a very persuasive tool. On the other hand, I did not find blackmail to be a useful technique. Of course, it has been used by the KGB. Personally I did not like blackmail, however, because I felt it could drive the agent into the hands of the target nation's counterintelligence branch.

What were the political views of the agents you handled in Japan? How many agents did you direct?

Roughly, about one third of the agents I handled were socialists and Marxist in outlook. Another third could be characterized as neutral, or in the political center. The final third were in¬dividuals on the right side of the political spectrum. By 1979, I was handling 10 agents and developmental contacts, with whom I had 20 to 25 clandestine meetings a month. In the Tokyo residen¬cy, there were 5 case officers conducting active measures through 25 agents of influence. The overall number of KGB officers in the Tokyo residency was approximately 50 to 60 officers.

Did most of the agents you handled understand your real identity? Were they aware that you were a KGB officer?

I would say that the majority of them did not know this. They believed I was a New Times correspondent, and not a KGB intelligence officer.

Did you provide the journalists you handled with material to publish? In other words, did you give them actual stories and articles?

In my own case, I provided guidelines, themes, and informa¬tion, and then had the agent produce the article. I did not believe it would be wise to provide him with the entire article ready for publication. The reason behind my thinking was that each jour¬nalist has a particular style and method, and an article produc¬ed by me, or written back in Moscow, might stand out and tip off the counterintelligence of the target country. In general, you provide guidelines, themes, and objectives. You make sugges¬tions, and discuss how the agent might implement and accomplish the objectives.

Were you able to get the agents you handled to recruit other agents, in addition to carrying out active measures operations?

It is very rare to have an agent who can actually carry out a recruitment. It happens, but not very often. It is much more com¬mon to have an agent assist you in spotting or identifying a possi¬ble recruitment. Once a potential target has been spotted, you begin the lengthy process of assessing the individual to determine whether and how to approach him. Primarily, the agents I directed assisted me in this area by spotting possible targets for recruitment.

How did you determine whether to assign a particular task to one of your agents, and what approach he should take in con¬ducting an operation?

As I mentioned above, active measures operations in Japan were based on directives we received from Moscow. We often received these on a daily basis, three to five directives at a time. Usually, the active measures case officers meet with the group chief to determine how best to implement the directives. Once the plan is decided on, you generally check back with Moscow for approval. This is not necessary for every action, but it is necessary for most of them.

What, in outline form, were the overall objectives of Moscow's active measures operations conducted against Japan during the time you were stationed in Tokyo?

The first priority was to prevent further development of US- Japanese cooperation, and to provoke distrust between Japan and the United States on economic, political, and military issues.A second goal was to hinder good relations between Japan and the People's Republic of China, and to prevent the creation of a Washington-Peking-Tokyo triangle. A third objective was to create a pro-Soviet lobby among prominent Japanese politicians (through penetration of the Liberal Democratic and Socialist Par¬ties), leading to closer economic and political ties between the Soviet Union and Japan and the creation of a political monopo¬ly in the Japanese parliament. The Japanese government likewise was to be persuaded through the use of high-ranking agents of influence, business leaders, and the mass media. These were among the leading objectives.

Please outline, if you can, the Soviet KGB effort in Japan dur¬ing the years you were assigned there. Who were the most effective agents?

The KGB had a network of approximately 200 recruited agents in Japan, utilized by political intelligence, external counterintelligence, and the scientific and technological in¬telligence of the First Chief Directorate. Among the most effec¬tive agents were a former member of the government's Cabinet of Ministers, who headed a major parliamentary public organiza¬tion; several major officials of the Socialist Party; a prominent scholar on the People's Republic of China who had close con¬tacts with government officials; and several members of the parlia¬ment. In my own case, the most important influence agents I directed were journalists.
Our assessment of New Times demonstrates that a major part of its focus has been directed at attacking, denigrating, and criticizing the United States and NATO.

You used New Times as a means of cover while serving as a KGB officer in Japan. Did you also write for New Times? On what themes did you con¬centrate? Did you focus at all on the United States and NATO?

First of all, your assessment that the major focus of New Times is the United States and NATO is correct. However, as a New Times correspondent, my job was not to carry out overt pro¬paganda; this was only my cover. My principal responsibility as a KGB officer was to recruit Japanese journalists, parliamen¬tarians, and other elites for conducting various types of active measures. The KGB uses New Times for such activities. In the mid-1970s, New Times had twelve foreign correspondents, of which ten were KGB officers. However, of the other two, one was involved in a variety of activities with the International Department (ID). During my time, the two so-called "clean" cor¬respondents were assigned to the United States and West Germany.

Still, to make your journalistic cover believable, didn't you pro¬duce stories? Or were these prepared for you back in Moscow?

The general rule is that most KGB officers under journalistic cover do not write in the field. Stories are filed on their behalf. My case in Japan was somewhat unusual. I actually sent one or two articles back to New Times each month. Two reasons may explain this. First, I had an extensive understanding of Asia because of my postgraduate studies. Second, New Times had no one at its headquarters who was knowledgeable about Japan. To return to your earlier question, the themes covered in these stories were related, in many instances, to the United States. I had a degree of freedom regarding what to write, but this was within certain broad categories. Thus, in my writing the issues of US militarism, economic problems, and imperialism were related to Japan and Asia. In many ways, these subjects reflected the ma¬jor objectives of Soviet active measures in Japan — including the prevention of a further deepening of US-Japanese coopera¬tion, and the provoking of distrust in US-Japanese economic, political, and military circles.

Let us pursue this question of journalistic cover a little further. How extensive was your training as a journalist? Does the KGB emphasize that one should become an expert in the activities used for cover?

In my own case, the final stage of preparation for my assign¬ment to Japan consisted of spending almost one year with New Times in Moscow. I was expected to improve my journalistic skills, to study the mechanisms of editorial work, and to publish several articles. Thus, when I went to Japan, I could easily move into the journalistic community and carry out my real assign¬ment. I had genuine journalistic experience, and this made my cover believable. This is not an unusual experience. The KGB prepares its officers in this manner.

Besides journalistic cover, what other forms of cover are used extensively by the KGB for conducting active measures?

The foreign trade ministry, which is involved in numerous economic and business ventures throughout the world and sends many officials overseas, also is of great importance for the KGB. As is true in the field of journalism, the KGB officer designated for this kind of cover learns all about it before being assigned abroad.

Since you are familiar with New Times, let me ask you about its major targets. Whom do the Soviets seek to reach through this publication?

New Times propaganda in large part is directed against foreign elites. In Western Europe, this includes academics, journalists, political leaders, and so on. These are the kinds of individuals, the Soviets know, who read the magazine and are influenced by it. Additionally, New Times sets the line on various issues for foreign Communist parties. Although Problems of Peace and Socialism also serves this purpose, it only comes out once a month. New Times, on the other hand, appears weekly. Finally, New Times also is used for internal propaganda directed at the population of the Soviet Union. New Times, in other words, is directed against both foreign and domestic audiences.

While we are on the subject of overt propaganda, let me ask you about the International Information Department (IID), which was created in 1978. Why was this CPSU Central Committee department established? Was Moscow dissatisfied with the coor¬dination and performance of the overt propaganda effort?

First of all, I believe that the importance of the IID is overstated in the West. The IID is not on an equal footing with the Inter¬national Department (ID). While it is true that the IID has respon¬sibility for improving the timing, responsiveness, and coordina¬tion of the major overt propaganda channels of the USSR, this function was seen as necessary for internal audiences first and foreign audiences second. In other words, Moscow's dissatisfac¬tion was with internal effectiveness. Furthermore, the IID does not set propaganda themes. This is more the responsibility of the ID (under the direction of the Politburo and the Central Com¬mittee). For instance, it is the ID - and not the IID - that directs and sets the themes to be covered in New Times. The respon¬sibility of the IID is to coordinate the various overt propaganda channels for internal and external audiences.

Based on your work with the International Department, please outline, if you will, how Moscow maintains influence over the international front organizations. How closely are these activities directed and monitored in the field?

First of all, Moscow does not influence the international fronts. Rather, it controls these organizations, through the ID. The main products of the fronts (appeals, conferences, publications, etc.) are decided on and crafted by the ID. For example, the Soviet Afro-Asian Solidarity Committee (AASC), under the close guidance of the International Department, manipulates the Afro-Asian People's Solidarity Organization (AAPSO). Likewise, the Soviet Peace Fund, also an active tool of the ID, is responsible for manipulating the World Peace Council. In each case, the ac¬tivities of these organizations are directed toward supporting Soviet objectives. One way control is maintained is through domination of the leadership organs of these organizations. For instance, the majority of the AAPSO's presidential council is con¬trolled by the Soviet Afro-Asian Solidarity Committee. Thus, all activities of the AAPSO are managed by the ID.

How does the ID control the activities of the local affiliates of the AAPSO and the WPC? Is this more difficult?

Depending on the situation, it may be more difficult. One frequently-used channel of control is through the local Com¬munist party, which often is also controlled and directed by the ID. The US Peace Council is a case in point. Local arrangements and control also may be exerted through local KGB assets under covert direction.

What would be an example of an actual campaign or action directed by the ID against the United States?

The Vietnam Support Committee, a department of the Soviet AASC, helped to direct the AAPSO's anti-Vietnam War cam¬paign on a worldwide basis. One of its programs was to use American deserters for international propaganda spectaculars. The AASC handled these deserters once they got to the USSR.
The KGB also was involved, and established a route of escape for the deserters through Japan. To assist in this, the KGB penetrated the Japanese Vietnam Peace Committee, a very active organization consisting of intellectuals. In addition to the AAPSO, the WPC was very active in promoting Soviet propagan¬da against US involvement in Vietnam.

How do the fronts receive funding?

Again, this depends on whether you are talking about the in¬ternational front itself, or about a regional or local organ of the front. In the case of the WPC, funding comes directly through the Soviet Peace Fund — which is to say, through the ID. The Soviet AASC provides a similar channel to the AAPSO. The AAPSO then may use this funding to conduct various activities specified by the ID, or to fund other organizations, such as so-called national liberation movements in the Third World. Fund¬ing to local affiliates of the WPC or the AAPSO, or to other international fronts, goes from the ID to the local Communist party by way of a KGB channel. This is one route for local assistance.

The major bureaucratic elements for formulating overt and covert propaganda are the ID and the KGB. In the field, do representatives of these bodies work closely together to coordinate activities, or is this all set out in Moscow? How are orders receiv¬ed, and how specific are they?

First of all, in foreign active measures operations, the major actors are the ID and the KGB. The IID plays a very minor role in conducting these activities. Its work is carried out in the Soviet Union. In the field, we generally would receive, on a weekly (and sometimes on a daily) basis, guidelines from Moscow regarding the various themes and activities we were to carry out. These orders could be quite detailed or only broad guidelines, depen¬ding on the issue. For long-term projects with which we all were familiar and on which we all had worked — for example, the anti-neutron weapon campaign or other major campaigns directed at denigrating the reputation of the United States — the orders we received were simply guidelines. Of course, we would meet as a staff to discuss how to implement these orders.

Is there room for innovation? Could you make changes in the orders, and then carry them out?

In our staff meetings we could recommend changes in orders and guidelines, and there was a great deal of room for innova¬tion. However, in most cases these plans were sent back to Moscow for review. You generally would not take the initiative without first receiving authorization from the center. However, turnaround time was short, only a few days, so you could proceed quickly.

So, if an opportunity appeared — say, for example, a former high-ranking US military officer, who now is a leading figure in the disarmament movement, were to visit Japan — you could move quickly to take advantage of this target?

Yes. We would quickly make recommendations to the center, and receive Moscow's position. For such a special case, the response would be immediate.
How is the effectiveness measured of the operations carried out by the officer in the field? Is there close oversight? How im¬portant are results?
First of all, the field officer's activities are closely monitored and evaluated in fitness reports. Success is of vital importance. However, measuring success is sometimes complicated. Certain things are easy to measure and evaluate — for instance, the out¬put of a journalist you had recruited (the number of articles published, or the amount of confidential information collected), or the parliamentary activities of one of your agents (making cer¬tain statements, initiating certain discussions, or creating a favorable atmosphere supporting Soviet goals in parliament). These elements are evaluated against certain standards by your superiors.
Other operations, on the other hand, are more difficult to assess. For example, the success of the peace movement in Europe is a fact, and the KGB and the ID have been extensively involv¬ed. However, the growth of the European peace movement can¬not be attributed solely to KGB and ID involvement. Hence, the evaluation of the effectiveness of active measures operations in the growth of the peace movement is more subjective. Still, the head of the local KGB residency and the chief of the active measures group are responsible for evaluating and rating such activities.

What happens in the case of failure?

If the individual officer fails to produce, this ultimately can lead to his being called home. However, generally the members of the active measures group will attempt to assist and advise the officer in ways of improving performance. The way to pre¬vent failure at this level is extensive training and learning before an officer begins to conduct operations. This includes training both at home and abroad. The KGB realizes this, and the resources are available for this training. The importance of this type of investment is understood. When a major operation fails, there is an extensive review, but the failure itself will not paralyze the residency. You pick up the pieces, wait awhile, and then begin again. The current situation in Japan as a result of my defection in 1979 is an example of one such situation.

Many persons in the West discount the Soviet use of agents of influence, international front organizations, and other active measures operations as either not very important or not very ef¬fective. How would you respond to this assertion?

First of all, indicators do exist of the importance the Soviets place in these activities. The size of the overt and covert active measures effort is massive, and this can be studied and documented. I can tell you from an insider's vantage point that the ID and the KGB receive all the resources and personnel needed to carry out this massive effort. There are never any shortages. Of course, this is not a recent development. An examination of the history of the CPSU will demonstrate the importance of such tactics. A close reading of what Soviet leaders write and say also provides insight into the importance of these measures. Although we discussed effectiveness earlier, let me restate that all active measures operations are assessed against a set of standards. Suc¬cess is a vital ingredient. The growth of the Soviet active measures effort over the last five to ten years is due to progress in the field.


(полный текст книги есть в Библиотеке cайта Игоря Ландера на http://lander.odessa.ua/lib.php )